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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
THE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM 
OF THE SCOTTISH WATER INDUSTRY: 
A JOB HALF FINISHED 
by John W Sawkins, Department of 
Economics, School of Management, Heriot-
Watt University 
1. Introduction 
It is now over two years since the Scottish 
water industry underwent its most radical 
restructuring in half a century. During that 
time the three public water authorities (PWAs) 
have taken great steps forward in integrating 
and improving the separate management and 
operating systems inherited from their 
predecessors - the twelve regional and islands 
councils. Yet they have also been troubled by 
issues which have hit the headlines in the 
Scottish press: issues such as the water 
contamination incident on the outskirts of 
Glasgow last winter, concerns over the state of 
Scotland's bathing waters, the large price rises 
fixed by the Secretary of State, reductions in 
staff numbers and industrial relations 
difficulties which have led to strike threats by 
employees. The restructuring and reform of 
regulatory arrangements in 1996, it would 
appear, did not eliminate the difficulties of 
delivering water and sewerage services at a 
stroke. 
The advent of a new Government, with an 
election commitment to conduct a thorough 
review of the industry, promised to address 
continuing public disquiet over the new 
institutional arrangements. In fact, the review 
did litde to disturb the previous Government's 
settlement Indeed the December 1997 
announcement of its findings effectively put 
on hold the water industry policy debate until 
after the establishment of the Scottish 
Parliament. 
Against that background this paper seeks to 
reopen the policy debate by analysing the 
political economy of the reform and 
restructuring process to date. After describing 
Volume 23, No.4,1998 
the institutional changes it analyses the main 
benefits of reform, outlines the current 
challenges faced by the industry and goes on 
to consider the way in which the 'unfinished 
business' of economic regulatory reform and 
corporate governance might be brought to a 
satisfactory conclusion in the near future. 
2. Restructuring and Reform 
There were three main reasons underlying the 
Conservative Government's intention to 
reform the Scottish water industry in the early 
1990s. First was the need to invest heavily in 
the infrastructure to bring Scottish water and 
sewerage services up to European standards. 
Years of under-investment had resulted in a 
situation in which it was estimated, in 1992, 
that £5 billion should be spent over 15 years to 
ensure compliance with European Directives 
on Drinking Water (80/778/EEC) and Urban 
Waste Water Treatment (91/271/EEC)1. 
Second was the Government's economic 
objective of limiting increases in the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement. Consequently 
they sought to restructure the industry in such 
a way as to lever in private sector finance to 
deliver this large investment programme, 
thereby limiting its impact on the public purse. 
Third, there was anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that the structure of the industry inherited from 
the 1975 local government reorganisation was 
too fragmented. Opportunities for exploiting 
considerable financial, technical and 
managerial economies of scale were 
apparently being lost. 
Proposals to undertake a fundamental reform 
of Scottish local government provided the 
Government with an appropriate opportunity 
to re-examine institutional arrangements for 
the delivery of water and sewerage services. 
Consequently, under the terms of the Local 
Government etc. (Scodand) Act 1994 
responsibility for these services was 
transferred from the nine regional and three 
islands councils to three new Public Water 
Authorities (PWAs). The Central Scotland 
Water Development Board was abolished, and 
a new economic regulatory body, the Scottish 
Water and Sewerage Customers Council 
(SWSCC), was established to protect the 
interests of consumers. The Secretary of State 
for Scotland became responsible for the 
appointment of all PWA and SWSCC board 
members, removing responsibility for these 
services from local government control for the 
first time. New pricing arrangements were put 
in place whereby the SWSCC was responsible, 
in the first instance for scrutinising and 
approving PWA Charges Schemes. In the 
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event of deadlock between these parties the 
Secretary of State would adjudicate. 
Although privatisation of the industry was 
rejected, private sector involvement came 
about through engaging private sector firms in 
the financing and delivery of large 
infrastructure projects under the auspices of 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). This 
allowed authorities to stay within the External 
Financing Limits set by the Secretary of State, 
yet deliver large programmes of capital 
investment. Accompanying this initiative 
were large price rises for consumers, 
cushioned to a certain extent by central 
Government which granted Transitional 
Sewerage Relief on domestic bills (Table 1). 
Prior to reorganisation consumers had paid for 
water services through their council tax 
demands. On these, only a water charge was 
displayed, with the costs of sewerage being 
met out of general taxation. To avoid the 
impression that a large one-off increase in 
water related charges had occurred, with an 
aggregate water and sewerage item being 
displayed on council tax demands for the first 
time, the Government implemented the 
transitional subsidy arrangement. However, 
although overall price rises were reduced by 
this scheme, and although PWAs operated 
within strict aggregate price caps set by the 
Scottish Office, consumers in several areas of 
the country experienced double digit price 
rises as charge harmonisation across the new 
PWA regions was brought in (Tables 2a and 
2b). 
One of the central concerns of political 
opponents to restructuring was the perceived 
loss of accountability through the removal of 
locally elected councillors from water boards 
and their replacement by central government 
appointees. When in opposition the Labour 
party pledged, if elected, to replace unelected 
board members with councillors from the 
unitary authorities. Once in government they 
found an industry buoyed up and enjoying the 
fruits of the removal of the dead hand of local 
political control. Consequently their water 
industry review, the results of which were 
announced in December 1997, left the new 
settlement largely intact. Although a larger 
number of local councillors were appointed to 
PWA boards" the new Government drew back 
from a return to local government control. 
Instead it was stated that the new Scottish 
Parliament would be able to revisit the 
arrangements, altering them if necessary. 
Of more significance, however, was the 
recognition that the economic regulatory 
framework established under the 1994 Act was 
not strong or sophisticated enough to cope 
with the reconfigured industry. Under the old 
arrangements the Scottish Office was 
ultimately responsible for economic and 
environmental regulation of the industry, 
although the environmental regulatory powers 
were, in part, delegated to bodies such as River 
Purification Boards. From 1st April 1996 
environmental regulation became the 
responsibility of the newly created Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency, with the 
Scottish Office retaining responsibility for 
drinking water quality regulation only. 
Certain economic regulatory powers were 
delegated to the newly created SWSCC, 
although ultimate responsibility for prices and 
the overall macroeconomic framework within 
which the industry operated was retained by 
the Scottish Office. 
This arrangement worked tolerably for the first 
couple of years during which agreement was 
reached between the PWAs and the SWSCC 
on price rises. In January 1998 the SWSCC, 
unable to reach agreement with the PWAs, 
referred the draft charges schemes to the 
Secretary of State. After consideration the 
draft charges schemes were accepted, with 
minor amendments, thereby calling into 
question the ability of the SWSCC to protect 
consumer interests. This outcome effectively 
underlined the need - identified in the 
Government's Review - for a new, more 
powerful, economic regulator, combining the 
functions of the SWSCC with some of those 
retained by the Scottish Office. As yet, 
however, the Government has not signalled 
when Parliamentary time might be given over 
to legislation to bring this about. 
The Benefits of Reform 
Clearly, the reforms have affected the main 
industry stakeholder groups in different ways. 
Nevertheless it is possible to identify particular 
developments which have benefited the 
majority of industry stakeholders. 
Financially, all PWAs have benefited through 
the exploitation of economies of scale. In oral 
evidence given to the House of Commons 
Scottish Affairs Committee* the three PWA 
chief executives quantified this effect. For the 
East of Scotland Water Authority, Mr Rennet 
indicated that on the first day of its operation 
the Authority had an operating budget which 
was £1.1 million less than for the aggregated 
former authorities. By the end of the first year 
a further £6 million of savings had been made, 
and a target of a 26% reduction in operating 
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costs (in real terms) had been set for the year 
2001. Similar cost savings had been made in 
the North and West of Scotland Authorities. 
In the North the cost base had been reduced by 
£7.5 million over two years. In the West 
employee costs were £4 million lower than 
they were in the final year of the regional 
councils. All authorities had also benefited 
from savings through bulk purchasing of pipes 
and power, and the contracting out of services 
such as vehicle maintenance. 
These savings went some way to releasing 
additional money for capital investment, that 
was further invigorated through continued 
engagement in Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
schemes. Under previous local government 
arrangements infrastructure investment 
planning was fragmented and invariably 
hampered by the inadequate amounts of 
finance made available to them by central and 
local government. In England and Wales, the 
1989 privatisation of the regional water 
authorities proved to be the start of the largest 
programme of capital investment in its history. 
Consequently the Conservative Government 
sought to promote the same end in Scotland, 
where the new PWAs were of a sufficient size 
to maintain teams of specialist staff able to 
deal with the legal, administrative and 
financial complexities of PFI projects. 
Although full privatisation was rejected, the 
principle of private sector involvement was 
established in the face of opposition from the 
Labour, Scottish Nationalist and Liberal 
Democrat parties. Once in Government the 
Labour Party found the attractions of PFI 
irresistible, and encouraged the PWAs to 
increase the amount of private sector capital 
employed in the industry. Table 3 a lists die 
size and status of the industry's PFI projects to 
date. This stimulus has lifted overall levels of 
capital investment in the Scottish Industry 
(Table 3b) and provided a means by which 
private sector expertise has been accessed by 
the PWAs. 
One of the qualitative improvements in 
industry performance from the consumer's 
point of view has been the increased 
transparency of the water authorities' 
operations since 1996. Before reorganisation 
differing accounting and reporting systems 
made the comparative analysis of operations 
problematic. Although minutes of the regional 
and islands councils' water subcommittees and 
other ad hoc performance related pieces of 
information were notionally available to all 
members of the general public, access to tfiis 
information was difficult to secure and the 
results hard to interpret. In the informational 
vacuum Scottish water industry 'myths' were 
perpetuated by local and national politicians 
unable or unwilling to call into question the 
performance of public sector operators for 
whom they were ultimately responsible. One 
of the favourite 'myths' was the assertion that 
Scottish consumers enjoyed the highest quality 
drinking water in the UK - or indeed in 
Europe. Clearly, if this had indeed been the 
case there would have been litde need for the 
massive programme of mains renewal and 
reconstruction currently being undertaken by 
the successor bodies. In fact water quality in 
Scotland, although good, was no better than 
that enjoyed by consumers in England and 
Wales. Commenting on the report "Drinking 
Water Quality in Scotland 1996" the Scottish 
Environment Minister, Lord Sewel summed up 
the situation as follows, 
"The report published today, while not 
showing an overall improvement in 
performance, does show an improvement in 
some important aspects. However ,the 
equivalent report for England and Wales, 
published by the Drinking Water Inspectorate 
in June 1997, showed an overall level of 
compliance with the regulations at taps in 
England and Wales of 99.6 per cent compared 
to 98.6 per cent in Scotland. 99.2 per cent of 
tap samples in England and Wales met the 
crucial microbiological standard, whereas 
only 97.7 per cent of samples in Scotland met 
this standard." 
[Scottish Office News Release 1645/97, 3rd 
November 1997] 
The foundation for improved transparency and 
information flows was laid by the Local 
Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994. This 
legislation required PWAs to produce Codes 
of Practice (section 66), Schemes of Charges 
(sections 76 and 77) and audited accounts 
(sections 87 and 88). Reporting and 
information systems of the twelve predecessor 
bodies were consolidated by the PWAs and the 
task of public relations was professionalised in 
a way not seen before. The tangible effects of 
this included the publication of regular press 
releases, information leaflets and annual 
reports and accounts by each water authority. 
Public meetings of the water authority boards 
were advertised in the national press and 
systematic customer consultation has become a 
feature of their operations. In addition PWA 
chief executives have appeared before the 
House of Commons Scottish Affairs Select 
Committee to respond to MP's questions on 
the public record. 
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This culture of increased openness has, if 
anything, improved rather than diminished the 
authorities' public accountability. Systems of 
official scrutiny, in addition to those outlined 
above, have been opened up through the 
establishment of the SWSCC, its Area 
Committees™, and the transfer of some - but 
significantly not all - of the economic 
regulatory functions from the Scottish Office. 
Freed of the need to adhere to a parochial 
political agenda the SWSCC has been able to 
operate as a quasi-independent regulatory 
body, and has used its limited powers to obtain 
comparative information from the authorities 
to good effect. This mode of operation was not 
open to regional councillors - the local 
economic regulators - in the pre-1996 industry. 
Another related benefit of reform has been the 
commitment on the part of the water 
authorities to become increasingly customer 
orientated. Regular reporting and liaison with 
customers and their watchdog, the SWSCC, 
has facilitated this. But it is clear that there 
has been a shift in the mindset of management 
within the industry away from producer-driven 
priorities - the 'producer knows best' culture -
towards customer-driven priorities. Evidence 
for this may be found in the East of Scodand 
Water Authority's new customer strategy. A 
press release of 26/6/98 articulated this in the 
following way, 
"The strategy will systematically change the 
values and culture ofESW to embrace not only 
customer care but also customer awareness 
and commitment. The key drivers behind 
the strategy are: customers define quality, 
not ESW, the provider; ESW will develop 
customer distinct competencies for all 
employees; the ultimate goal is customer 
loyalty, not acceptance." 
[East of Scotland Water Press Release 
26/6/98] 
In an industry which remains dominated by 
engineering professionals with long experience 
of working in the public sector this is a radical 
and significant development. The momentum 
for this change is not all internally generated, 
however. Legislation, political initiatives such 
as the Scottish Affairs Committee scrutiny and 
the activities of the SWSCC in making 
comparisons with the PWAs' English and 
Welsh counterparts, all add to this 
development. 
The sum of these gains is considerable. But 
not all industry stakeholders have benefited 
unambiguously from the reforms. 
4. Current Challenges and Unfinished 
Business 
Changes and reforms on this scale were always 
likely to unsettle and threaten employees 
working in the industry. Under the protective 
umbrella of local government control, the 
numbers working in the industry had declined 
only slightly in recent years, compared to the 
rather more dramatic falls in England and 
Wales (Tables 4a and 4b). On the whole the 
substantial job losses of the past two years 
have been accomplished through early 
retirement, natural wastage and voluntary 
redundancy packages". Industry unions did, 
however, threaten strike action over a pay 
offer of 2.5% made by the West of Scotland in 
late 1997. A settlement was reached after the 
Authority raised its offer to 3%. Across 
Scotland, water industry unions have 
expressed concern about the delinking of 
salaries from local government pay scales, and 
their negotiating position in an industry in 
which there is increasing private sector 
involvement. Generally, therefore, the 
environment in which employees work has 
become more uncertain. 
On the other hand, the reduction in employee 
numbers and downward pressure on wages has 
reduced the industry's cost base quite 
dramatically. Ultimately this reallocation of 
resources should benefit the authority and the 
consumers it serves through the delivery of 
lower operating costs and charges. 
Another rather unwelcome development from 
the industry's point of view has been the 
gradual ebbing away of public goodwill 
towards the water authorities, and confidence 
in their management. Despite remaining 
firmly within the public sector adverse 
political and press comment, combined with 
raised customer expectations have led to a 
souring of the relationship between customers 
and water authorities. Under the old local 
government regime failures to deliver a high 
quality service met with a greater degree of 
tolerance and understanding than was seen, for 
example, in the December 1997 diesel spillage 
episode in the West of Scotland area. In this 
case the fact that the water authority's chief 
executive was the previous head of the 
Strathclyde Region water department, and that 
the incident was clearly not caused or 
precipitated by the institutional changes, 
appeared to go over the heads of the Water 
Authority's media critics. It remains to be 
seen whether the resignation of the Authority's 
Chairman succeeds in bolstering public 
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confidence in its much-criticised senior 
management. 
Distracted by these headline-grabbing local 
incidents the more fundamental policy debate 
appears to have been put on hold by a 
Government busy with other legislative 
priorities. Nevertheless two issues, which 
aroused much controversy during the early 
1990s, will continue to underpin the 
management and regulatory difficulties 
experienced by the industry unless tackled by 
policymakers in the first year of a Scottish 
Parliament. These issues are economic 
regulation and corporate governance. 
As noted earlier the 1996 settlement, in which 
price regulation was delegated to the SWSCC 
and macroeconomic / efficiency regulation left 
with the Scottish Office, has proved untenable. 
This division of responsibilities has weakened 
overall regulatory control by allowing Water 
Authorities to play one body off against the 
other. In the 1998/99 price setdement the 
Secretary of State for Scotland chose to make 
limited concessions to a SWSCC concerned 
about the effect of rapidly increasing water 
charges on low income households. 
Nevertheless the very large price rises 
proposed by the Authorities were permitted -
almost in their entirety". Allowing regulatees 
to 'second-guess' their front line regulator in 
this way undermines regulatory credibility and 
moral authority; consequently it is extremely 
unclear just how effective the SWSCC will be 
in protecting the interests of domestic 
customers at the time of the next price-setting 
exercise. Such regulatory uncertainty will have 
real costs for consumers. 
The recommendation contained in the 
Government's industry Review, of establishing 
an independent economic regulatory body 
along the lines of Ofwat in England and 
Wales, is an important and welcome one. 
Accountable to the Scottish Parliament 
through the Scottish Executive the regulatory 
body's director's position would be established 
in statute, protecting the holder of the post 
from overt political interference. However 
without rapid implementation of this 
recommendation the Scottish consumer lacks 
an effective economic advocate and champion 
against the naturally monopolistic suppliers of 
this essential service. The risk is that 
insufficient pressure will be put on the Water 
Authorities to justify, publicly, increased 
charges. Long overdue debates, such as that 
over universal domestic metering in Scotland, 
will once again by stifled by a political and 
engineering establishment wishing to defend 
and preserve the charging status quo. 
Government and industry will continue to set 
the policy agenda, and consumers will remain 
rather passive recipients of whatever level of 
service these other stakeholder groups deem 
appropriate. 
The second piece of 'unfinished business' for 
policymakers is the reform of corporate 
governance. The removal of the industry from 
local government control has, on the whole, 
proved to be a liberating experience for 
managers in the industry, and it is to the credit 
of the new Government that - in the face of 
fierce political opposition - its Review did not 
completely reverse the changes implemented 
in 1996. However, it was recognised that 
greater freedom should be accompanied by 
greater accountability, and for that reason the 
Government increased the numbers of locally 
elected councillors on each of the boards. 
Doubts remain, however, over whether a 
higher proportion of local councillors sitting 
on water authority boards implies greater 
public accountability. Under the pre-1996 
arrangements this accountability link was 
opaque as the main election platforms of local 
councillors seldom contained reference to local 
water issues. Other issues such as housing, 
education, transport and health generally 
headed their political agendas and consumed 
most of their time and energies. Arguably, a 
new authority board, with its members selected 
carefully and made responsible to the 
Secretary of State, and through him to 
Parliament promises equally effective 
democratic control. 
Ultimately, however, the argument over the 
number of local councillors with seats on 
various boards is a rather sterile one. What 
matters is first, whether there is a fair cross 
section of civic society and opinion 
represented on these bodies, and second, 
whether there are systems in place to allow 
consumers to communicate with their 
representatives. John Kay articulated the first 
point in a recent discussion of corporate 
governance of a quite different institution - the 
London International Financial Futures 
Exchange (LIFFE). 
"There is no perfect solution. But we can 
detect some elements of the right approach. 
Detach councils and governing boards from 
day to day - or even month to month -
decisions. They will inevitably undermine 
managerial responsibility and often 
degenerate into posturing by conflicting 
interest groups. Give strong managers 
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freedom to develop the business of the 
[LIFFE] exchange, but make sure they are 
periodically accountable for their success in 
that. And accountable to a group that includes 
not only the relevant interest groups, but a 
strong leavening of objective outsiders. The 
role of outsiders is less to protect the public 
interest, although that is relevant, but rather to 
prevent any interest group exerting too much 
or too noisy influence. That is how 
infrastructure assets - from water boards to 
universities - were generally managed before 
the state took control. And it often worked. " 
[John Kay 'A Fair Trade in Governance', 
Financial Times 27/5/98.] 
The principle of accountability is a good one. 
But the new Scottish Executive and Parliament 
would be wrong to believe that they, or indeed 
local government, had any monopoly right 
over the corporate governance of this industry. 
Arguably a 'leavening' of objective outsiders 
on every board is an essential element of a 
publicly accountable Scottish water industry. 
And, hand-in-hand with this must come a 
commitment on the part of board members to 
be aware of the preferences and opinions of 
their 'constituents', whether they be voters or 
the disenfranchised members of society. 
Conclusion 
The 1996 reform of the Scottish water industry 
set in motion a series of changes which have, 
already, benefited consumers of the service. 
In the closing years of the century the new 
PWAs have an unrivalled opportunity to 
deliver a large, quality enhancing, investment 
programme that will allow the industry to meet 
the increasingly strict environmental standards 
laid down by the European Union. However 
the issues of economic regulation and 
corporate governance threaten to undermine 
the gains of the past two years unless Scottish 
politicians renew their determination to 
modernise and stimulate organisations which 
are amongst the largest natural monopolies 
still operating in the public sector. It remains 
to be seen whether the new Scottish Executive 
and Parliament gives the industry the time and 
priority it deserves. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Transitional Sewerage Relief £ million. 
Water Authority 
North 
East 
West 
Total 
1996/7 
22.4 
27.3 
40.0 
89.7 
1997/8 
14.9 
18.2 
26.6 
59.7 
1998/9 
7.4 
9.0 
13.2 
29.7 
Source: 1996/7 Table 2.13 Departments of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Forestry 
Commission (1996), The Government's Expenditure Plans 1996-7 to 1998-9, Cm 3214, HMSO 
Edinburgh. 1997/8 The Scottish Office. 1998/9 Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers Council. Total 
does not sum for 1998/9 due to rounding. 
Table 2a : Percentage Increases in Net Domestic Water and Sewerage Charges for Band D 
Households (including Transitional Sewerage Relief). 
WATER 
AUTHORITY AREA 
NORTH 
Tayside 
Grampian 
Highland 
Western Isles 
Orkney 
Shedand 
EAST 
Borders 
Forth Valley 
Fife 
Edinburgh & 
Lothians 
North 
Lanarkshire 
&East 
Dunbartonshire 
Kinross 
WEST 
Dumfries & 
Galloway 
Strathclyde 
% Increase 1996/7 
- 1997/8 
39.58 
32.23 
32.23 
16.40 
16.40 
16.40 
28.58 
53.89 
42.36 
28.58 
28.73 
36.55 
28.73 
28.73 
% Increase 
1997/8 - 1998/9 
39.35 
32.95 
32.95 
21.57 
21.57 
21.57 
28.05 
59.34 
44.15 
28.05 
31.16 
31.84 
31.16 
31.16 
Source: Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers Council. 
Notes: i) Transitional Sewerage Relief was granted for the first time in 1996/7. 
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Table 2b: Net Domestic Water and Sewerage Charges for Band D Households (including 
Transitional Sewerage Relief). 
WATER 
AUTHORITY AREA 
NORTH 
Tayside 
Grampian 
Highland 
Western Isles 
Orkney 
Shetland 
EAST 
Borders 
Forth Valley 
Fife 
Edinburgh & 
Lothians 
North 
Lanarkshire 
&East 
Dunbartonshire 
Kinross 
WEST 
Dumfries & 
Galloway 
Strathclyde 
Net Domestic Band D Water and Sewerage 
Charges 
1996-97 
£ 
81.50 
97.00 
97.00 
120.50 
120.50 
120.50 
95.50 
52.50 
71.50 
95.50 
92.00 
81.50 
92.00 
92.00 
1997-98 
£ 
113.76 
128.26 
128.26 
140.26 
140.26 
140.26 
122.79 
80.79 
101.79 
122.79 
118.43 
111.29 
118.43 
118.43 
1998-99 
£ 
158.52 
170.52 
170.52 
170.52 
170.52 
170.52 
157.23 
128.73 
146.73 
157.23 
155.33 
146.73 
155.33 
155.33 
Source: Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers Council. 
Notes: 
* Transitional Sewerage Relief was granted by the Government for the first time in 1996/7. 
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Table 3a: The Scottish Water Industry PF1 Project Progress as at 20th July 1998. 
Procuring Agency 
North of Scotland 
Water Authority 
North of Scotland 
Water Authority 
North of Scotland 
Water Authority 
Total 
East of Scotland 
Water Authority 
East of Scotland 
Water Authority 
East of Scotland 
Water Authority 
Total 
West of Scotland 
Water Authority 
West of Scotland 
Water Authority 
West of Scotland 
Water Authority 
Total 
Project Name 
Inverness main drainage / 
Fort William sewage 
treatment 
Dundee, Carnoustie & 
Arbroath waste water 
treatment 
Aberdeen, Stonehaven, 
Fraserburgh & Peterhead 
sewage and sludge 
treatment 
Esk Valley purification 
scheme 
Almond Valley trunk 
sewer & Seafield sludge 
incineration 
Levenmouth purification 
scheme 
Dalrnuir secondary 
sewage treatment 
Daldowie / Shieldhall 
sludge treatment centres 
Meadowhead, Ayr, 
Stevenston & Inverclyde 
sewage treatment 
Capital 
Value 
£ million 
45 
100 
80 
225 
21 
100 
47 
168 
50 
60 
80 
190 
Status 
Signed 
Tenders 
invited / 
negotiation 
Potential 
Tenders 
invited / 
negotiation 
Tenders 
invited / 
negotiation 
Tenders 
invited / 
negotiation 
Tenders 
invited / 
negotiation 
Tenders 
invited / 
negotiation 
Potential 
Financial 
Close 
(expected) 
December 
1996 
October 
1998 
May 1999 
December 
1998 
December 
1998 
Spring 1999 
December 
1998 
December 
1998 
March 1999 
Source: The Scottish Office. 
Table 3b: Capital Investment Since Reorganisation. 
North of Scotland 
East of Scotland 
West of Scotland 
Total 
1996/7 
£m 
62.2 
83.3 
104.8 
250.3 
1997/8 
£m 
65.7 
84.0 
129.3 
279.0 
% Increase 
5.6 
0.8 
23.4 
11.5 
Source: Annual Reports and Accounts. 
Note: Includes infrastructure maintenance expenditure. 
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Table 4a: Number of Full-Time Equivalent Employees at March 31st. 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Scotland 
6,121 
6,144 
6,129 
6,155 
6,182 
6,194 
6,094 
6,162 
6,229 
6,514 
6,608 
6,665 
6,653 
6,921 
6,803 
Northern Ireland 
2,605 
2,524 
2,518 
2,510 
2,605 
2,552 
2,569 
2,584 
2,598 
2,633 
2,533 
2,463 
2,418 
2,308 
2,260 
England and Wales* 
66,551 
63,173 
59,606 
57,502 
56,774 
55,356 
54,575 
53,908 
46,436 
46,313 
45,123 
44,605 
43,650 
39,892 
37,379 
Source: Waterfacts '92, Waterfacts '97 
Notes: 
* Figures for England and Wales post 1990 exclude NRA staff. Most of these transferred from the 
Regional Water Authorities in 1989. 1990 figures are averages. 
Table 4b: Full-Time Equivalent Employees per Thousand Resident Population. 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Scotland 
1.19 
1.19 
1.19 
1.20 
1.21 
1.22 
1.20 
1.21 
1.22 
1.27 
1.29 
1.30 
1.30 
1.35 
1.33 
Northern Ireland 
1.69 
1.63 
1.62 
1.60 
1.65 
1.62 
1.62 
1.63 
1.62 
1.63 
1.55 
1.50 
1.47 
1.39 
1.36 
England and Wales* 
1.34 
1.27 
1.19 
1.15 
1.13 
1.10 
1.08 
1.06 
0.91 
0.90 
0.88 
0.86 
0.84 
0.77 
0.72 
Source: Waterfacts '92, Waterfacts '97, Annual Abstract of Statistics 1998. 
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Table 5: Average (Weighted) Household Water and Bills 1998/9. 
ENGLAND & WALES* 
Anglian 
DwrCymru 
North West 
Northumbrian 
Severn Trent 
South West 
Southern 
Thames 
Wessex 
Yorkshire 
SCOTLAND** 
North of Scotland 
East of Scotland 
West of Scotland 
Water and Sewerage Bills 
1998/9 
£ 
288 
294 
234 
228 
222 
354 
257 
201 
266 
226 
156 
140 
138 
Sources: 
*Ofwat (1998) 1998-99 Report on tariff structure and charges, Ofwat, Birmingham. 
** Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers Council, The Scottish Office. 
Notes: 
*Average houshold bills relate to the ten water and sewerage companies only and include metered and 
unmetered customers. Nineteen water only companies also supply around a quarter of English and 
Welsh consumers. The average (weighted) water (not sewerage) bill for tfiese consumers was £120. 
** Figures derived by weighting the average council tax bill in each property band in each water 
authority area, by the proportion of households in each band in each area. 
' Water and Sewerage in Scotland: Investing for our Future (1992). 
" After the Review 16 of the 33 member of the water authority boards (excluding Chief Executives) 
were elected local councillors. 
Hi
 1st April 1998. 
iv
 One for each of the three PWAs. 
v
 Evidence given to the Commons Scottish Affairs Select Committee by Mr Findlay - Chief Executive 
of the North of Scotland Water Authority - on 1st April 1998 confirmed that this had been the case. 
North of Scotland had shed over 100 jobs. West of Scotland had shed around 400 employees during 
the same period. 
" In absolute terms Scottish water and sewerage charges still remain below those charged in England 
and Wales. Compare Table 2b with Table 5. 
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